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MATH FOR THE PEOPLE: REINING IN
GERRYMANDERING WHILE PROTECTING
MINORITY RIGHTS*
GOWRI RAMACHANDRAN **
Americans overwhelmingly want fair, democratic elections. They’ve rightly
become energized behind getting rid of the practice of gerrymandering—widely
understood to be a scourge on democratic principles. They want district maps
that are fair in that they don’t unduly favor one major political party over
another or incumbents over newcomers. But what does it mean to be fair and
democratic in a country with a history of rampant racial subordination in
elections? What does a fair map look like in that context, and what is the process
for drawing it?
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it chose to answer that
question by enacting, consistent with an “antisubordination” view of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, a “results” test. That test imposes a duty
on states to ensure that minorities have the same “opportunity . . . to elect
representatives of their choice” as do other voters. Yet in the context of
redistricting, that promise is currently fulfilled only erratically and incompletely,
in part due to the federal courts’ imposition of a different duty on states,
consistent with a “colorblind” or “anticlassification” view of those amendments.
The courts have forbidden the use of race as a “primary” factor in redistricting
decisions, even when done to benefit racial minorities. Thus, a mapmaker
wishing to comply with the law—to fulfill both Congress’s and the courts’ views
of the Reconstruction Amendments—must thread the tiniest of needles.
At the same time, those wishing to end the scourge of gerrymandering have
failed, thus far, to square the obligation to protect minorities with the principles
of neutrality and nonpartisanship that underlie their movement. Litigants and
activists have generally accepted “Voting Rights Act compliance” as a legitimate
* © 2020 Gowri Ramachandran.
** Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. This essay has benefited enormously from
conversations and inspiration at two workshops generously organized and conducted by the Metric
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districting criterion and have even described it as one of the highest priority, but
they have not grappled with how to reconcile the Act’s antisubordination thrust
with the courts’ anticlassification values.
This Article brings good news, however. Inspired by recent attention to the
problem of partisan gerrymandering, mathematicians have made advancements
that could be used to reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable views of the
Reconstruction Amendments—antisubordination versus colorblindness—at
least in the context of redistricting. The political will is also forming. Now is the
time for Congress to leverage both.
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INTRODUCTION—THE REDISTRICTING REVOLUTION
Gerrymandering—the practice of manipulating electoral district
boundaries for some group, party, or (usually incumbent) person’s advantage—
has been reviled at least since the term was coined in 1812. 1 It has received
massive public attention recently, in part because of a 2016 decision of a threejudge district court in Wisconsin holding that partisan gerrymandering is not
only justiciable, it is unconstitutional. 2 Prior to this decision, challenges to
partisan gerrymandering had been deemed virtually nonjusticiable, given the
Supreme Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer. 3 After years of litigation, the
Supreme Court finally concluded in Rucho v. Common Cause 4 that partisan
gerrymandering is indeed nonjusticiable in the federal courts. 5 But in the
intervening years, the public became excited that, perhaps, the “scourge” of
gerrymandering 6 could at last be reined in. The popular press published
numerous articles on the subject, 7 and even former President Barack Obama

1. Jennifer Davis, Elbridge Gerry and the Monstrous Gerrymander, LIBR. CONGRESS: IN
CUSTODIA LEGIS (Feb. 10, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/02/elbridge-gerry-and-themonstrous-gerrymander/ [https://perma.cc/FB7U-TJSZ].
2. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843, 856 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct 1916
(2018).
3. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). In this case, a plurality of the Court held that even though extreme
partisan gerrymanders were likely unconstitutional, challenges to them were nonjusticiable. Justice
Kennedy delivered the fifth vote for the result but explicitly indicated that litigants might in the future
present the federal courts with a manageable standard for adjudicating when a redistricting plan has
been unconstitutionally gerrymandered in a partisan manner. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion); id. at 306
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
5. Id. at 2506–07.
6. At the time of writing this Article, a Google search for “scourge and gerrymandering”
(without the quotation marks) yielded over 40,000 results, including, for example, Eric Lupher,
Redistricting: The Scourge that (Still) Haunts Michigan Government, CITIZENS RES. COUNCIL MICH.
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://crcmich.org/redistricting-the-scourge-the-keeps-on-haunting-michigangovernment/ [https://perma.cc/S4BN-EXY2], and One for the People, ECONOMIST (July 2, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2015/07/02/one-for-the-people [https://perma.cc/5QNSJHEC].
7. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Still Unclear About Gerrymandering? See Exactly How It Worked
in North Carolina, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2018/01/10/how-north-carolina-republicans-almost-got-away-with-their-egregious-gerrymander/
[https://perma.cc/7LKS-6KD9 (dark archive)] (describing a three-judge district court’s finding of
partisan gerrymandering in North Carolina and mentioning that the Supreme Court was set to rule on
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018), later that year); Clive Thompson, Gerrymandering Has a Solution
After All. It’s Called Math, WIRED (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/how-math-can-
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and former Attorney General Eric Holder spoke out against the practice. 8
Mathematicians, in particular, became highly motivated to assist in developing
good methods for identifying partisan gerrymanders, with lawyers interested in
helping them understand the legal context in which those methods could be
employed and, of course, interested in using those methods in litigation. 9
However, while there has been great public and scholarly excitement about
ridding the redistricting process of the scourge of partisan gerrymandering, less
attention has been paid to a longstanding problem: the duty of states to protect
minority voters’ power under the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) 10 while also
avoiding violations of the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits making race
the primary factor in drawing a district or districts, even when done for the
benefit of minorities. 11 The space that states have been left with to negotiate
these legal mandates is both miniscule and confusing. 12 Even a nonpartisan
mapmaker attempting to meet these goals could understandably find him- or
herself unsure of how to comply. Moreover, the mapmaker can be subject to
save-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/MQQ8-3HSP (dark archive)] (explaining the efficiency gap
measure of partisan gerrymandering).
8. A video featuring the two describing what gerrymandering is and explaining why it is unfair
was released by the National Democratic Redistricting Committee (“NDRC”) on July 11, 2018. Nat’l
Democratic Redistricting Comm., President Obama on Gerrymandering, Redistricting, & the 2018 Midterm
Elections, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyIWjO94Lnk
[https://perma.cc/HUS2-BHNV]. While the NDRC often markets itself as opposed to
gerrymandering, much of the group’s activities appear to be targeted at increasing Democratic power
at the state level, not only to stop the gerrymandering attempts of Republicans but perhaps to engage
in their own pro-Democrat gerrymandering. See Edward-Isaac Dovere, Dem Redistricting Group Picks
Targets, Unleashes Obama, POLITICO (July 11, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/
07/11/democrats-redistricting-obama-708500 [https://perma.cc/D85N-ZZXD].
9. Moon Duchin and Mira Bernstein at Tufts University successfully created the Metric
Geometry and Gerrymandering Group (“MGGG”), https://mggg.org/ [https://perma.cc/7FRDTZA8], which not only has sponsored regional workshops and conferences on the topic for
mathematicians, political scientists, and lawyers but also has employed researchers—mathematicians,
computer scientists, and geographers—and has inspired published papers, whitepapers, and expert
reports on the topic for use by governments and courts. E.g., Gowri Ramachandran & Dara Gold, Using
Outlier Analysis To Detect Partisan Gerrymanders: A Survey of Current Approaches and Future Directions, 17
ELECTION L.J. 286 (2018); MOON DUCHIN, OUTLIER ANALYSIS FOR PENNSYLVANIA
CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING
(2018),
https://mggg.org/uploads/md-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3H7-DLBM]; METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., COMPARISON
OF DISTRICTING PLANS FOR THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2018), https://mggg.org/VAreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEJ6-KEKG]. Mathematicians and political scientists outside of MGGG
have also made advances. Wesley Pegden, Jowei Chen, and Jonathan Mattingly have served as expert
witnesses in litigation, and courts have relied on their identifications of partisan gerrymanders to strike
down those maps. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 642–50 (M.D.N.C.), vacated,
138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018); League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 770–77 (Pa. 2018).
10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 52 U.S.C.).
11. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 798 (2017); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993).
12. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018) (describing the situation as a “legal obstacle
course”).
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competing and confusing complaints from various stakeholders; even
organizations purporting to represent the interests of the same (and multiple)
racial minority group’s voters are sometimes at odds during the map-drawing
process. 13 In its current form, House Bill 1, the “For the People Act” passed on
March 8, 2019, 14 seeks to respond to the great excitement around taking partisan
politics out of redistricting, but it lacks any ideas for protecting and promoting
minority voters’ rights.
Fortunately, the recent advances of mathematicians and political
scientists, who have been primarily working on the problem of proving, in the
litigation context, that a map is the result of a partisan gerrymander, could be
employed for what should be a nonpartisan purpose: to truly fulfill the duty to
protect minority voters while still complying with the Constitution. As I detail
in Parts II and III, the Redistricting Reform Act, 15 with just a few
improvements, could leverage these advances to create more breathing room
and clarity for mapmakers, such as independent commissions, as they work to
fulfill their duty to protect minority voting power while staying within
constitutional guidelines. Moreover, this guidance would help ensure that
commissions avoid being captured, knowingly or not, by partisan or other
interests 16 and successfully create the nonpartisan maps that the public is
clamoring for. 17
Not only are these mathematical and scientific advances ripe for use to
solve the problem of treating minorities fairly in redistricting, the political
moment is right as well. Public concern with the fairness of elections and public
awareness of the importance of redistricting to achieve that fairness are
extremely high. 18 In passing the For the People Act, which includes the
Redistricting Reform Act, Democrats in the House of Representatives are
wisely responding to that public concern and awareness. As Representative
13. Id. at 2317, 2329, 2334 (describing the different stances of the Mexican American Legal
Defense Fund, the Mexican American Legislative Caucus, and representatives of Como, an African
American community, during the litigation and map-drawing process in Texas).
14. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
15. The Redistricting Reform Act of 2019 is the section of the For the People Act describing how
to operationalize independent redistricting commissions across the nation. Id. §§ 2400–2435.
16. ERIC MCGHEE, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., ASSESSING CALIFORNIA’S REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION
17–18
(2018),
https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r-0317emr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8N4-HYCV]. The Public Policy Institute of California’s study on California’s
independent redistricting commission shows a possible inadvertent Democratic lean and the possible
intentional capture of the commission by partisan Democrats posing as nonpartisan to the commission.
Id.
17. See Americans Are United Against Partisan Gerrymandering, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/americans-are-united-against-partisangerrymandering [https://perma.cc/M4UC-4T7L].
18. Annie Lo, Americans Are Transforming the Redistricting Process, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 19, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/citizen-and-legislative-efforts-reformredistricting-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/RN52-LJZZ].
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Sarbanes has shrewdly noted, a version of the Redistricting Reform Act could
become law if a Democrat wins the Presidency in 2020, so House Bill 1 serves
to show voters not only that his party is willing to respond to the public’s
concerns once given the power to do so but also how they plan to do so. 19 They
should not miss the opportunity, as they overhaul redistricting, to leverage
advances in math and computing that could lead to truly fair, not just neutral,
maps.
In Part I of this Article, I lay out the conundrum facing mapmakers trying
to navigate the Voting Rights Act’s duty to create equal opportunity for
minority voters with the federal courts’ prohibition on racial gerrymandering. I
show how this conundrum came about, not merely as a result of an
anticlassification approach to equal protection that is in tension with the Voting
Rights Act’s antisubordination thrust but also via judicial mistakes and
misunderstandings as well as institutional reluctance to police redistricting.
Fortunately, all three of these problems can be fixed via congressional action,
as I explain in the next two parts.
In Part II, I explain specific mathematical and computing advances that
have been made in recent years and how those advances can help reconcile two
competing visions of how to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments in the
voting context: the antisubordination vision, on the one hand, which seeks to
actively ensure minority voters are protected during redistricting, and the
anticlassification vision, on the other hand, which seeks to reduce attention to
race in redistricting. 20
If we want electoral maps that are fair for everyone, it is not enough to
demand neutrality and nonpartisanship. That leaves out the minority protection
that is necessary given our nation’s ugly history, 21 in which entire communities
were inarguably excluded from and intimidated out of voting for generations.
Of course, how to appropriately deal with a history of racial discrimination is a
thorny question that plagues our legal system in all kinds of arenas, not just
voting. In the context of voting, however, there is no individualized, private
cause of action available to even partially remedy the harm. We cannot, as a

19. Peter Overby, Democrats Say Their First Bill Will Focus on Strengthening Democracy at Home,
NPR (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/665635832/democrats-say-their-first-bill-willfocus-on-strengthening-democracy-at-home [https://perma.cc/C28T-6Z2P] (“‘Give us the gavel in the
Senate in 2020 and we’ll pass it in the Senate,’ Sarbanes said. ‘Give us a pen in the Oval Office and
we’ll sign those kinds of reforms into law.’”).
20. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1474–77 (2004) (describing these two now-competing
visions but proposing that they “are friends as well as agonists”).
21. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 363, 368 (1987) (providing arguments for reparations based on severe
harms committed by the United States that have multigenerational effects, such as the takeover of
Hawaiian lands and government as well as the internment of Japanese Americans).

98 N.C. L. REV. 273 (2020)

2020]

MATH FOR THE PEOPLE

279

remedy, double count the vote of an African American whose vote was
suppressed decades ago. We cannot find a candidate who was deterred from
even running for office by an unfavorable at-large electoral system and now say
that he wins if he gets 45% of the votes instead of 51%. Yet the history is there,
and its negative effects continue.
It is also not enough to simply assert, without further instruction, that
commissions must do the nearly impossible: comply with the VRA and the
Constitution. Therefore, in Part III, I put the solution in Part II into practice:
I propose the specific amendments to House Bill 1 that are necessary to fulfill
its promise of being truly “for the people.”
I. THREADING THE NEEDLE: COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 2 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Section 2 of the VRA requires that minority communities not have their
voting power diluted, even unintentionally. They must enjoy the same
opportunity as other groups to elect candidates they prefer. 22 Yet, the
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause forbids racial gerrymandering,
including when undertaken to benefit those same minorities protected by the
VRA. 23 Thus, mapmakers must thread a very small needle when complying with
both of these mandates. 24 Mathematicians and political scientists, too, have
struggled to appropriately incorporate VRA compliance as a criterion in their
methods for assessing partisanship of district maps. 25
Despite this difficulty, many state initiatives calling for independent
redistricting commissions, 26 as well as House Bill 1 in its current form, 27
mandate that commissions comply with both the VRA and the Constitution. In
fact, these two criteria are deemed to be of the highest priority, above all other
criteria, in House Bill 1 as well as in some state initiatives. 28 Why do, and why
should, activists and policymakers who are focused on ending the problem of
gerrymandering care so much about VRA compliance that they make it such a
22. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b), (d) (2012); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 10 (2009);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 & nn.16–17 (1986).
23. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910–11 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58
(1993).
24. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018) (using the phrase “legal obstacle course” to
describe the situation faced by mapmakers).
25. See Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 299 (describing how mathematicians have used
various unsatisfying methods such as “freezing” previously accepted opportunity districts as
unchangeable in their outlier analysis or weighting maps in a manner that favors overpacking of
minorities); DUCHIN, supra note 9, at 11 (identifying central “zones” around which district borders of
a theoretical opportunity district can vary, but with no identified rigorous manner for identifying those
zones).
26. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(A); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(1)–(2).
27. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 2413(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2019).
28. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d); H.R. 1 § 2413(a)(1).
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high priority? As I explain in the next section, the principles behind the VRA,
in particular section 2, are necessary for true fairness in politics.
A.

The Multigenerational Effects of Exclusion

Given our nation’s history of voting rights violations, pure neutrality
would in fact be undemocratic and unfair because the effects of exclusion from
political power and political voice are multigenerational. When the value of a
person’s vote is diminished drastically by packing and cracking, 29 increasing
heavily the likelihood that the person’s vote will be wasted, then the effect of
that devaluation goes far beyond the wasted vote itself. 30 The devaluation leads
to lower voter turnout, as it is pointless to vote when the odds one’s vote matters
are negligible. 31 It likely also leads to lower participation in many other parts of
the electoral process. If one’s vote, along with the votes of others in one’s social
group, are going to be wasted anyway, then why run for office, consider running
for office, call a candidate or elected official with one’s opinions, learn about a
candidate’s policy goals and values, attend party organizing meetings, or
attempt to form coalitions with other groups on a package of policy goals? 32
Even if people of color were only effectively deterred from political
participation in this way in the past, then we should still expect to see effects of
that on their descendants today. We would expect fewer young and middle-aged
people of color to have parents and grandparents with political connections and
experience than young and middle-aged whites. 33 We would expect fewer young
and middle-aged people of color to have grown up in a community that felt like
democracy worked for them and included them. It makes sense that when entire
communities are excluded from political participation they will have less
incentive than other communities to form social and cultural and ultimately
political coalitions in order to get attention paid to their preferred policy goals.
29. Packing is the practice of concentrating voters who tend to support certain candidates or
parties into a small number of districts so that their influence is limited to those few districts, while
cracking is the practice of splitting such voters into a large number of districts, so that they make up
too small a proportion of voters in each district to be able to elect their candidates of choice. See Gill
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018) (describing these practices).
30. Wasted votes are votes that a candidate did not need in order to win as well as votes for losing
candidates. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1592, 1606 (1993); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M.
McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015).
31. See Joel Jordan, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Voter Turnout 33, 36 (2017)
(unpublished thesis, Western Washington University), https://cedar.wwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1042&context=wwu_honors [https://perma.cc/LFJ2-X7QR].
32. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting
Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1536–37 (2002).
33. See Steve Phillips, It’s Time To Diversify the Democratic Party Leadership, NATION (Nov. 18,
2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/its-time-to-diversify-the-democratic-party-leadership/
[https://perma.cc/P4Z3-WRB7] (noting that leaders of major progressive fundraising organizations,
those who “control the party purse strings,” were not racially representative of the party’s voters).
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In other words, even after many of the devices, such as literacy tests. that
insidiously suppressed the votes of people of color were prohibited by the
Voting Rights Act, lasting harm had been done. 34 The same is true for
gerrymandering and electoral system choices (such as at-large elections) that
sought to dilute the voting power of minorities by forcing them to more often
cast wasted votes. 35 Indeed, if we accept racial polarization in voting as evidence
of these sorts of lasting effects, then there is good empirical evidence that the
problem lingers long after “politics has evolved beyond the days of threatened
lynchings for the exercise of the franchise.” 36 An analysis of voting patterns in
both the 2008 and 2012 elections showed that racial polarization was increasing37
in jurisdictions that had previously employed a “test” or “device” restricting
registration or voting. 38
There is no way, absent group-based 39 structural reform, to do anything
about these lasting, and even increasing, effects: We can’t engage in a holistic
individualized review of every voter, decide that some of them contribute to the
diversity of our nation’s political life more than others, and count those people’s
votes for more. 40 Even if we could, this would do nothing to transform the types
of political coalitions that voters and activists view as plausible ones. There are
no easy individual claims to reparations or narrowly tailored remedies that
would correct the lingering effects of past policies on our electoral systems and
practices. Our history requires structural attention to the opportunities of
minorities as voters, candidates, and community leaders to participate and be
represented in electoral politics.
That is why Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982
to add a results test aimed at reducing the racially subordinating effects of

34. Pildes suggests that, for instance, a relatively safe district might be necessary to encourage a
member of a racial minority that had been previously shut out of the process to run. See Pildes, supra
note 32, at 1522, 1536–37.
35. See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, “At-large” Elections as Violation of § 2 of Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973), 92 A.L.R. Fed. 824 (1989 & Supp. 2019) (describing the use of atlarge elections to dilute minority voting power, the difficulty of proving intent behind this practice,
and the possibility of using section 2 of the VRA to challenge this practice based on its effects).
36. Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in Racial
Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 206–07 (2013).
37. Id. at 205–06.
38. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4–5, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303–10304 (2012)).
39. See Guinier, supra note 30, at 1599–602 (arguing that the idea of voting rights as individual
rather than collective is at odds with the law).
40. But cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–15 (2016) (upholding this
approach in undergraduate level admissions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–44 (2003)
(calling for this approach in graduate level school admissions).
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discrimination, even that discrimination which is in the past. 41 In addition to
forbidding intentional exclusion from voting on the basis of race, the VRA is
now violated whenever a minority community is less able than other
communities to elect its candidates of choice. 42 These violations would normally
require structural ameliorative action, such as drawing “opportunity districts”
in which minority communities have enough voting strength that they could
elect candidates they prefer. 43 Unfortunately, as I demonstrate in the next
sections, the VRA as enforced by the federal courts has severely limited the
impact and applicability of the section 2 results test.
B.

The Federal Courts’ Anticlassification Doctrine

The federal courts have, since the Rehnquist era, promoted an
anticlassification view of the Equal Protection Clause. Under this view, the core
problem that the Equal Protection Clause counters is the problem of
governments taking account of race, that is, classifying people on the basis of
their race. Chief Justice Roberts famously provided an (empirically
unfounded) 44 reason for this view in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 45: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 46 This stands in stark contrast
to the antisubordination view of the Equal Protection Clause that the VRA,
particularly section 2, represents. Under the antisubordination view, the core
harm that the Equal Protection Clause counters is the harm of racial
subordination.
Thus, employing the anticlassification view, courts have forbidden
mapmakers from taking account of race as the primary factor in choosing how
to draw a district, even if the mapmaker is seeking to benefit racial minorities. 47
The only potentially available defense to a showing that race was indeed a
primary factor is that this was necessary to comply with the VRA. Yet the
Supreme Court has not even clarified that this would certainly be an acceptable
defense 48 and has instead indicated that mapmakers must seek to comply with
41. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)).
42. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b), (d) (2012).
43. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018).
44. See Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Science: Why and How Difference Makes a Difference, 21
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 77, 86–87 (2010).
45. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
46. Id. at 748.
47. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797–98 (2017); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993).
48. See Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2315 (assuming, and not holding, that compliance with the VRA is a
compelling interest justifying use of race as a primary factor in drawing a district, but noting that
narrow tailoring would require proof of a state’s belief that the district had to be drawn in order to
comply with the Act).
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the VRA, which of course would require being race-conscious, while also
avoiding letting race become the primary factor in a districting decision. 49
This means that even if a benevolent mapmaker identifies a situation in
which minority voters have likely been denied the same opportunity as other
voters to elect candidates of their choice, it will be incredibly difficult for the
map to be redrawn to provide that opportunity. How is one to ensure that
minority voters get equal opportunity without paying a great deal of attention
to race? And what does equal opportunity even mean in the context of an
anticlassification norm? Further, as the next two sections detail, the federal
courts have interpreted the requirements of the VRA in an extremely narrow
and likely mistaken manner. Without amendments clarifying what equal
opportunity means and correcting these judicial errors, House Bill 1 and similar
state laws governing redistricting commissions will likely exacerbate these
problems by reiterating that VRA compliance is of extremely high priority,
second only to constitutional compliance. 50
C.

The Mistake: Requiring Availability of Majority-Minority Districts

The federal courts have severely limited the instances in which creation of
an opportunity district is required. At the same time, they may have induced
overpacking that harms minorities for several reasons. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 51
the seminal case interpreting section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme
Court outlined three elements that must be met in order for a community to
have a section 2 right to an opportunity district. 52 The first element requires
that one show it is possible to draw a “majority-minority” district, on the theory
that only in this case would it be possible for the minority to elect a candidate of
preference in an ideally drawn map or voting system. 53 Thus, only in this case
would any opportunity have been denied by the use of a different map or voting
system (such as the at-large system challenged in Gingles). 54
But this claim about possibility is erroneous, and the element is therefore
unduly restrictive. First, it relies on a somewhat-outdated assumption of
severely racially polarized voting, in which whites do not vote for minoritypreferred candidates in any significant numbers. 55 Second, it relies on a
simplified and outdated blacks-versus-whites view of racially polarized voting
patterns. Particularly in multiracial, multireligious, and multilingual
environments, minority voters may often be able to, in coalition with other
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. (describing the problem as a “legal obstacle course”).
See For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 2413(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2019).
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 50 & n.17; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11 (2009) (reiterating this standard).
Gingles, 487 U.S. at 50 n.17.
See Pildes, supra note 32, at 1527–30.
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communities, elect a candidate of their choice in districts where their share of
the voting age population is well below fifty percent. 56 Much lower percentages
of minority voting age population may be all that is needed for an opportunity
district to “perform,” either as a so-called “crossover district” 57 or as a so-called
“coalition district.”58 Yet, in Bartlett v. Strickland,59 a plurality of the Supreme
Court did not permit “crossover districts” as a means of satisfying the Voting
Rights Act and affording minority opportunity. 60 The Court has not spoken to
whether “coalition districts” could be permissible under section 2, and some
lower courts have held that they are, 61 but there is a great deal of legal
uncertainty on the issue.
Of course, the election of any candidate involves coalitions. Minority
communities themselves are not monolithic—African American communities
are coalitions of men and women; naturalized and birthright citizens;
Christians, Muslims, and atheists; straight and queer persons; and more. 62 It is
somewhat arbitrary to decide that African American men and women who often
share candidate preference constitute one “community” but that African
American and Latino voters who may share candidate preference instead
constitute a “coalition” of two communities. Nevertheless, these are the terms
used by the federal courts for situations of somewhat less extreme levels of racial
polarization than that seen in earlier eras.
D. The Exacerbating Element: How Racial Polarization May Be Proven
The next two elements of the Gingles standard require that one show
racially polarized voting in the community and that the community lacks

56. See Perez v. Abbott, 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 921 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“As discussed in the
Conclusions of Law, however, this Court finds that coalition districts may be required by § 2, so long
as Plaintiffs satisfy Gingles with regard to the coalition.”); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas
M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
2143, 2207 (2015).
57. This is the term some courts use for a district in which minorities have an opportunity to elect
candidates of their preference because, despite racially polarized voting, some reasonable proportion of
whites is willing to vote for the minority-preferred candidate. See, e.g., Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13.
58. This is the term used to describe a district in which a minority community has an opportunity
to elect its candidates of choice because, despite racially polarized voting, some proportion of voters
who are members of another racial, language, or ethnic minority are willing to vote for the first minority
community’s preferred candidate. For instance, African American voters may prefer candidate A, and
enough Asian American voters may also prefer candidate A, so that candidate A has a reasonable chance
of winning. See, e.g., id.; Perez, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 921.
59. 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
60. Id. at 14.
61. See, e.g., Perez, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 921.
62. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (coining the term intersectionality and making the point that black men and women
experience different forms of discrimination, as do white women and black women).
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numerical strength under the challenged voting system, on the grounds that the
combination of racial polarization and numerical minority is what produces the
comparatively reduced ability to elect a preferred candidate. 63 When voting is
racially polarized, the majority community gets to elect its preferred candidate
for many seats, despite the lack of support from minority voters, because it is
the numerical majority. But the minority community cannot elect its preferred
candidates because it is a numerical minority, and there aren’t enough white
voters willing to support the minority-preferred candidate in order to win an
election. However, the methods that federal courts accept for showing racially
polarized voting are difficult to meet when minorities are not geographically
segregated. 64
One of the standard methods used by expert witnesses in federal courts to
show racial polarization is called “ecological inference.” 65 Voting in the United
States is generally anonymous, so there is no official record of whom white,
black, Asian American, or Latino voters actually voted for. Thus, experts
instead look at the vote totals for various candidates within each precinct, along
with the racial makeup of voters in each precinct. For instance, in precinct A,
Latino voters might make up 95% of the registered voters, and candidate X
might have received 85% of the votes in that precinct. In precinct B, Latino
voters might make up only 5% of the registered voters, and candidate X might
have received only 20% of the votes in that precinct. In precinct C, Latino voters
might make up about 50% of the registered voters, and candidate X might have
received about 50% of the votes in that precinct. The expert will run a regression
to see how well correlated the varying racial makeup of the precincts is with the
varying levels of support for candidate X. If the correlation is strong, then this
is used to infer racially polarized voting—the inference is that the reason
candidate X got more votes in the heavily Latino district is that Latino voters
prefer candidate X and non-Latino voters do not. 66 However, if Latino voters
in the jurisdiction are not so heavily geographically segregated, then the Latino
voting age population will not vary so much across the precincts—it might vary,
for instance, only between 40% and 60%, as opposed to between 5% and 95%.
Without any examples of heavily segregated precincts, it will be harder to
substantiate a correlation between racial makeup of the precinct and candidate

63.
64.
65.
66.

See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
See Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 56, at 2159–68.
See id. at 2177.
See id.
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preference. 67 Courts have accepted other forms of evidence of racially polarized
voting, such as exit polling data, but this data is not always available. 68
Additionally, multiracial dynamics can mask racial polarization. 69 Suppose
Latinos exhibit high levels of racial polarization with respect to whites in a
particular area. They tend to prefer candidate X, but whites tend not to prefer
candidate X. Suppose that Asian Americans also live in this area in significant
numbers, but those Asian Americans who live in white neighborhoods vote
similarly to whites, while those who live in nonwhite neighborhoods—whether
they be predominantly Latino, Asian American, or a mix of the two—vote
similarly to Latinos. There may be precincts that have very low levels of Latino
voting age population, but that show strong preference for candidate X because
the precincts are predominantly Asian American. And there may be precincts
that have fairly significant levels of Asian American voters—say 30%—but that
nevertheless do not exhibit any discernible levels of support for candidate X
because these are majority white precincts, and therefore the Asian American
voters are not predominantly the ones who favor candidate X. In such a
situation, a strong correlation between levels of Asian American population in
a precinct and levels of support for candidate X will not appear. That is because
the level of support that we can expect from an Asian American voter is not
independent of the demographics of the neighborhood. In reality, though, this
is a situation in which Latino and white voters do in fact vote in a racially
polarized manner. It may also be an area with high potential to draw a
“coalition” district, just not of the sort currently imagined by federal courts.
Rather than aiming to draw a district with a particular level of nonwhite voters,
one could aim to draw a district with a particular number of nonwhite precincts.
Thus, under the federal courts’ interpretation, the Voting Rights Act
applies only to communities that are quite segregated and can prove that they
possess a section 2 right to an opportunity district, thereby providing a basis of
permission for a map-drawer to protect them. Given that no rule clearly
prohibits accidental or thoughtless overpacking of those minorities, one can see
how it would be easy to create a heavily majority-minority district to “protect”
the population rather than two districts with a strong enough minority
percentage to form coalitions with other groups—whether that be another racial
minority, a language minority, youth, or sexual minorities. 70 This can happen
by accident, or incumbent minority choice candidates may even have an
67. Of course, if Latino voters are so heavily segregated that there are very few precincts with
low percentages of Latino voters, it will similarly be hard to show racially polarized voting. But in this
instance, the jurisdiction is somewhat naturally “packed” with respect to minority voters, and they will
likely end up with something like an opportunity district even in the absence of litigation to create an
enforceable “right” to one.
68. See Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 56, at 2159.
69. See id.
70. See Pildes, supra note 32, at 1551.
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incentive to encourage and conspire with legislators representing the majority
in order to overpack minorities and protect their own seats. 71
E.

Courts vs. Commissions

An additional reason the federal courts have chosen a narrow definition of
section 2 rights is that they are concerned with the capacity of courts to oversee
redistricting, given the numerous competing and overlapping criteria that must
and should be considered. This concern was so strong in the context of partisan
gerrymandering that it led to the Supreme Court holding such claims
nonjusticiable. 72 And in Strickland, the plurality opinion stated clearly that the
fact that section 2 is enforced through the courts was part of the reason it found
the creation of so-called crossover districts impermissible under the Act:
Determining whether a § 2 claim would lie—i.e., determining whether
potential districts could function as crossover districts—would place
courts in the untenable position of predicting many political variables
and tying them to race-based assumptions. The Judiciary would be
directed to make predictions or adopt premises that even experienced
polling analysts and political experts could not assess with certainty,
particularly over the long term. 73
But this concern is not present at all when a redistricting commission, as
opposed to a federal court, acts to create opportunity districts. Thus, there is a
strong argument that, even without clarification from Congress that the
standards of Gingles and Strickland are too strict, a redistricting commission
could consider the creation of more rather than fewer opportunity districts as a
positive criterion without first meeting the demand of Gingles that it be possible
to create a majority-minority district.
Finally, litigation over whether race has been used appropriately in
redistricting can be reduced by the use of ensemble analysis 74 to check for
partisan results in the maps being considered by commissions. Commissions
can ensure that whatever maps they ultimately choose are, in fact, substantively
fair when it comes to partisan results. They can choose maps that score well on
measures of minority protection, for instance on number of opportunity
71. Paul Taylor, GOP Will Aid Civil Rights Groups in Redistricting, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 1990),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/04/01/gop-will-aid-civil-rights-groups-inredistricting/0ebde0d3-4088-4e5c-803f-d83436010836/
[https://perma.cc/9Q8H-BZLC
(dark
archive)] (describing an alliance to create more majority-minority districts in order to benefit the
Republican party by packing minority voters into fewer districts, and quoting Senator Trent Lott: “‘A
lot of us think it is blatantly unfair when you say a district has to be carved out’ to create a minority
seat . . . ‘[b]ut having said that, there is no question that over the long run, it will redound to the benefit
of Republicans.’”).
72. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
73. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17 (2009).
74. See infra Section II.A (explaining this type of ensemble analysis in detail).
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districts, but that also score well on measures such as efficiency gap and
proportional representation of the major parties. By choosing maps that create
minority opportunity, but that are not unnecessarily Democrat or Republican
favoring, commissions can reduce the incentive for partisan groups to challenge
the maps in the first place.
In Part III, I will outline the specific changes that Congress can make to
House Bill 1, in order to create, within the confines of the anticlassification
doctrine, a bit more breathing room for commissions and, in particular, to avoid
the implication that by referencing the Voting Rights Act Congress intends to
validate the errors of Gingles and Strickland. With these amendments, House
Bill 1 could create a bit more space for redistricting commissions to protect and
promote minority voters’ power in a structural way—by creating opportunity
districts—while remaining compliant with the federal courts’ view of what the
Constitution requires.
II. HOW TO SATISFY ANTICLASSIFICATION AND ANTISUBORDINATION
On to the good news: With or without the additional breathing room that
I recommend Congress create in Part III, the best available mathematical
methods, in particular Markov Chain Monte Carlo (“MCMC”)-style methods
that I describe in the next section, can help redistricting commissions and other
mapmakers avoid maps that dilute the voting power of minority voters.
Importantly, these methods can help them do so without subordinating other
redistricting principles to the desire to help or to avoid harm to minority voters.
These new mathematical methods are able to create ensembles of maps that
incorporate multiple districting criteria at once without treating any one
criterion as dispositive. They further enable mapmakers to choose from those
ensembles those that are within acceptable ranges along criteria that are
particularly important under state and/or federal law, such as partisan fairness 75
or compactness. 76 These ensemble methods are thereby perfectly suited to avoid
the use of race as a primary factor in drawing one or more districts. 77 This will

75. Some state redistricting commission laws specify some form of partisan fairness as a
requirement, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(e) (“Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of
favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.”), as does the
For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 2413(a)(2) (2019) (“[T]he redistricting plan
developed by the independent redistricting commission shall not, when considered on a Statewide
basis, unduly favor or disfavor any political party.”).
76. Many states prefer more “compact” districts to less compact districts. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. XXI, § 2(d)(5) (requiring the Citizens Redistricting Commission to treat geographical compactness
as a positive factor in redistricting, “to the extent practicable,” and stating that “nearby areas of
population [should not be] bypassed for more distant population”).
77. Cf. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (“[T]he party attacking the legislature’s
decision bears the burden of proving that racial considerations are ‘dominant and controlling’ . . . .”
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995))).
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help commissions, even in the absence of congressional action, to remain
compliant with the Equal Protection Clause while still avoiding the dilution of
minority votes.
A.

MCMC-Inspired Methods

Most of the mathematical methods I have referenced were developed in
the context of attempts to find mathematical solutions to defining an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. As I have explained in recent work,78
providing a simple standard for demonstrating a partisan gerrymander proved
difficult for a variety of reasons. First, the definition of partisan
gerrymandering is itself unclear. 79 Some definitions emphasize partisan
intent. 80 Others emphasize partisan results, such as a lack of proportionality
between the share of votes a major party receives and the share of seats it
receives. 81 Others emphasize lack of competitiveness due to too many “safe”
districts, in which the percentage of Democrat or Republican voters is very high,
such that it is unlikely a candidate from a different political party could ever
carry the district. 82 Some fail to distinguish between these concerns, even
though a map can perform very poorly with respect to one concern—e.g.,
competitiveness—while performing very well with respect to another—e.g.,
partisan results. For instance, a map may have zero competitive districts but
may contain safe Democrat districts and safe Republican districts in exact
proportion to the shares of voters that tend to prefer those political parties.83
This problem of defining partisan gerrymandering is not insurmountable,
however, as those attempting to find partisan gerrymanders could simply ensure
that all these elements—competitiveness, intent, and results—are considered.
Indeed, that is what district courts in Wisconsin and North Carolina did in

78. Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 287.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116 (1986) (describing partisan gerrymandering as
an “intentional effort to favor” one political party over another); Justin Levitt, Intent Is Enough:
Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993, 2009–18 (2018) (arguing for an
intent standard).
81. See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 113 (describing partisan gerrymandering as when a map
“unconstitutionally dilute[s]” votes); Emily Bazelon, The New Front in the Gerrymandering Wars:
Democracy vs. Math, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/
magazine/the-new-front-in-the-gerrymandering-wars-democracy-vs-math.html
[https://perma.cc/
8T6T-CLR2 (dark archive)] (emphasizing the result of nonproportional representation); Ingraham,
supra note 7 (same).
82. See, e.g., MCGHEE, supra note 16, at 14–17 (using competitiveness of districts as one measure
of success of California’s independent redistricting commission in achieving its goals).
83. See, e.g., Mira Bernstein & Moon Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Efficiency Gap, 64 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1020, 1021 (2017) (illustrating that a
map with no competitive districts and many safe districts receives a perfect efficiency gap score and
providing an example of this sort of map).
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rejecting maps for being too partisan 84 prior to the Supreme Court’s 2019
decision finding the entire question nonjusticiable. 85
The second reason that it has been difficult to provide a simple standard
for identifying partisan gerrymanders is that the particular geography and
demography of a state can create a natural tilt towards one major party or the
other. 86 This is especially the case given that mapmakers may legitimately need
to consider other criteria beyond partisan fairness, such as population equality,
contiguity, compactness, and avoiding the splitting of jurisdictions such as
counties or municipalities. For instance, in the two maps in figure 1, 87 suppose
the dotted lines represent some boundary, such as a county line, that may not
be split under a state’s laws. Suppose also that the state must comply with the
constitutional rules that districts have equal populations. State A is naturally
Republican favoring, due to the packing of many Democrat voters into one
county. The map drawn for State A, where district lines are denoted by bold
lines, therefore scores worse than the map drawn for State B on “efficiency gap,”
a simple measure of substantive partisan fairness. (The efficiency gap for State
A is 1/3, while the efficiency gap for State B is 1/6. 88 A larger “efficiency gap”
indicates a map that is more substantively unfair. 89) Yet, this apparent relative
unfairness of map A stems from the natural packing of Democrat voters—not
from any partisan manipulation on the part of the mapmaker who was simply
trying to avoid creating a county split. 90

84. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 637, 690 (M.D.N.C.), vacated, 138 S. Ct.
2679 (2018); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884, 898, 930 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 1916 (2018).
85. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
86. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and
Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 240 (2013).
87. These figures originally appeared in Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 290–91.
88. See id. at 291 (showing the calculations).
89. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 30, at 834 (defining the efficiency gap and
explaining why larger efficiency gaps are indicative of a more unfair map).
90. Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 291.
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Figure 1.

Motivated by this challenge, mathematicians have developed methods
intended to be useful in proving and assessing partisan gerrymandering but that
could also be applied to solve the problem of compliance with the Voting Rights
Act and Equal Protection Clause. They create ensembles of maps that
incorporate the many criteria mapmakers must take account of, while notably
leaving out partisan goals. These map ensembles are then scored along whatever
measure of substantive fairness is desired, say proportionality, 91 or efficiency
gap, or mean-median gap. 92 The map being challenged in litigation is then
compared to the distribution of scores that the ensemble of maps produces, to
check if it is an outlier. 93 A visual depiction of one distribution of scores for one
such ensemble is reproduced in figure 2. It was provided by Jonathan Mattingly
in his expert report 94 before the three-judge panel in Common Cause v. Rucho, 95
the North Carolina case eventually dismissed as nonjusticiable by the Supreme
Court. 96

91. Proportionality as a measure of substantive, partisan fairness compares the proportion of seats
a party obtains to the proportion of votes it received. If the seat share is close to the vote share, the
map is considered fairer. See id. at 289–90 (explaining the proportional representation measure in more
detail).
92. Mean-median gap as a measure of substantive, partisan fairness compares the mean share of
votes received by a party in each district to the median share of votes received by that party in each
district. The larger the gap between these two, the more unfair the map is considered likely to be. See
Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A Diagnostic
Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 312–14 (2015) (defining the mean-median gap measure and
explaining what its results mean).
93. See Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 293–98.
94. Declaration of Jonathan Mattingly, Exhibit 2, at 4, Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp.
3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (No. 1:16-CV-1026-WO-JEP) [hereinafter Mattingly Report].
95. 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018).
96. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).

98 N.C. L. REV. 273 (2020)

292

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

The distribution uses as its “score” for substantive fairness the number of
Democrats that would have been elected under a given map in 2012. In other
words, each map in the ensemble that Mattingly created was scored on that
basis. As one can see from the image, for slightly more than 10% of the maps in
the ensemble, five Democrats would have been elected. For slightly under 40%
of the maps in the ensemble, six Democrats would have been elected. For about
40% of the maps, seven Democrats would have been elected. The marker
“Judges” in figure 2 indicates how a map that was drawn by a “simulated
bipartisan redistricting commission of retired North Carolina judges as part of
the ‘Beyond Gerrymandering’ project at Duke University” 97 compares to the
ensemble. The judges’ map would have resulted in six Democrats being elected
in 2012, a result that is typical as compared to the ensemble, in which the vast
majority of maps result in six or seven Democrats being elected in 2012. The
markers NC2012 and NC2016 show how the actual maps enacted by the North
Carolina legislature in 2011 98 and 2016 compare to the ensemble. These maps
would have resulted in only four Democrats being elected in 2012, a result that
almost never happened in Mattingly’s ensemble, as we can see from the fact
that the percentage of maps in which four Democrats would have been elected
is so small as to be almost indiscernible. Thus, the legislature’s maps are quite
extreme outliers compared to the ensemble, while the judges’ map is quite
typical.

97. Mattingly Report, supra note 94, at 1.
98. The map enacted in 2011 was used in the 2012 elections, thus Mattingly chose to depict it as
NC2012 in his image. Id. at 1, 4.
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Figure 2.

So long as the ensemble of maps created for this sort of outlier analysis
incorporates legitimate districting criteria, those districting criteria cannot serve
as an excuse for the fact that the map is a partisan outlier. 99 And, since the entire
ensemble was created for the particular state at issue, that state’s particular
geography and demography cannot serve as an explanation either. In other
words, the sort of natural packing exhibited in our hypothetical “State A” map
in figure 1 cannot be the explanation for why a challenged map is an outlier,
since the entire ensemble takes into account where the voters in the state reside.
Essentially, this approach controls for legitimate districting criteria as well
as the state’s particular geography and demography. The technique is analogous
to well-established methods for proving employment discrimination: Simulate
hiring, promotion, or some other employment practice in the absence of
discrimination, in order to create a distribution of what these practices would
look like in the absence of discrimination. Compare the defendant-employer’s
actual hiring results to that distribution, and if those outcomes constitute
enough of an outlier, the factfinder is permitted to infer that discrimination is
the reason for the outlier result. 100
In the context of redistricting, however, creating the ensemble of maps to
which the challenged map is compared constitutes an incredible computational
challenge. The number of ways to assign precincts, census blocks, or some other
99. See id. at 16 (detailing the districting criteria incorporated into the ensemble).
100. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301–13 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334–56 (1977).
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voter-tabulation district into electoral districts is massive. Indeed, it is so large
that the full set of ways cannot be fully enumerated using current computing
capabilities. 101 There are nearly 290,000 census blocks in North Carolina, 102
which must be assigned to thirteen congressional districts. When additional
restrictions are placed on these assignments, such as population equality across
electoral districts 103 or contiguity of electoral districts, 104 and when additional
criteria are considered, such as avoidance of breaking county and other
jurisdictional lines, 105 then the problem of ensuring that one is sampling from
the full set of reasonable, legally valid maps—the target “map-space”—becomes
even more challenging.
In response to this challenge, a number of the leading methods of outlier
analysis have applied MCMC methods. 106 These methods are sometimes
modified for seeking as optimal a solution as is available but were originally
proven to solve the problem of sampling from the target map-space. One
example can be summarized as follows: Start with a seed map. Change that map
slightly, for instance, by moving a census block out of one district and into an
adjacent district. Assess whether this new, proposed map is better than the old
map by scoring the maps with a weighted sum of various criteria that one can

101. Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational
Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L.J. 351, 353 (2016). For instance, if we
want to divide fifty census blocks into five districts, we are attempting to partition a set of n = 50 blocks
into k = 5 non-empty subsets, or districts. The number of distinct ways to perform this partition is
described as the “Stirling number of the second kind,” or S (n, k) where n = 50 and k = 5. For a
description of Stirling numbers of the second kind, see Eric W. Weisstein, Stirling Number of the Second
Kind, WOLFRAMMATHWORLD (last updated Sept. 6, 2019), http://mathworld.wolfram.com/
StirlingNumberoftheSecondKind.html [https://perma.cc/8E63-CHXA]. For n = 50 and k = 5, the
number of ways to partition the set is a bit more than 7.4 x 1032. See Stirling Numbers of the 2nd Kind
(Table) Calculator, KEISAN ONLINE CALCULATOR, https://keisan.casio.com/exec/system/1292214964
[https://perma.cc/U79E-KGRF], for a calculator for this purpose.
102. Geographies: 2010 Census Tallies, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
geographies/reference-files/time-series/geo/tallies.html# [https://perma.cc/QE5R-HAF6].
103. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
104. Many states require that districts be contiguous, i.e., that there be no geographic separation
of one portion of a district from the rest of the district. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(3)
(“Districts shall be geographically contiguous.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(2) (2018) (providing an
exception to the contiguity requirement for districts that encompass more than one island).
105. Many states require that these types of jurisdictional splits be minimized. E.g., ARIZ. CONST.
art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(E) (“To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible geographic features,
city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts . . . .”). House Bill 1 currently requires
that the splitting of certain communities, including jurisdictional units, be minimized, although it
includes within the list of communities that should not be split ethnic communities, which could
ironically lead to overpacking of these groups to their detriment, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and the VRA. See For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 2413(a)(1)(D) (2019)
(“Districts shall respect communities of interest, neighborhoods, and political subdivisions to the extent
practicable . . . .”).
106. See Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 295–97 (citing examples of MCMC methods
being applied to the districting problem).
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code into the algorithm in advance. These criteria might be compactness,
amount of county splitting, population equality, etc. If the new proposed map
is better according to this weighted sum, move to the new map, and add it to
the ensemble. If the new proposed map is worse, flip a weighted coin to decide
whether to move to the new map, and add it to the ensemble. The coin is
weighted according to the ratio of the new map’s weighted sum and the old
map’s weighted sum. 107 This MCMC method will, if run for long enough,
sample from the probability distribution of all the maps, weighted by the
criteria chosen in advance.
However, it is not known for how long such an algorithm must run in
order to representatively sample from the map-space. If infinite computing
time is not available, as of course it never is, various modifications can be made
to increase our confidence that the method is sampling rather than getting
“stuck” shifting between maps that are quite similar to each other. 108 There are
also various rough methods that can be used to eyeball whether an MCMCstyle algorithm is in fact exploring the map-space rather than getting stuck.
These methods do not come with mathematical proofs of their accuracy, but as
applied to the problem of creating a map-ensemble, they can be used to get a
reasonable assessment of whether the algorithm is moving flexibly about the
map-space, capturing different parts of the space, or is instead getting stuck in
“plateaus” or “valleys” in the map-space. As just one example, in Mattingly’s
expert report in Common Cause v. Rucho, he describes how his team “animated”
the visual maps as the algorithm moved through the map-space and was able to
observe that “districts may travel from one end of the state to another.” 109 This
increased his confidence that “many types of redistrictings [were] sampled.” 110
Importantly for their use in redistricting by commissions, MCMCinspired methods flexibly incorporate criteria that are set according to the
107. Id. at 295. The method description has been very abridged here for a nontechnical audience.
In practice, for instance, maps are sometimes thrown out of the ensemble because they do not meet
some threshold on a particularly rigid criterion, such as population equality across districts. See, e.g.,
Mattingly Report, supra note 94, at 15–16 (explaining the “rejection sampling” process). Some
researchers have also tried changing maps more aggressively by periodically, or with some element of
chance during the random walk, selecting larger chunks of units and reassigning them across two
districts rather than flipping one unit at a time. See, e.g., METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING
GRP., supra note 9, at 13 (describing this method as the “ReCom” method and showing how it more
effectively traverses the map-space). Researchers will also often vary the “acceptance” ratio,
experimenting with making it more or less likely that the algorithm moves to a map with a worse
weighted sum than the current map. See, e.g., Mattingly Report, supra note 94, at 14 (describing this
process, called “annealing”). In other words, how willing the algorithm is to explore a portion of the
map-space with poor maps, in the hopes that this could lead to an area of the space with good maps, is
varied in order to find a degree of “willingness” under which high quality, but truly different, maps are
found quickly enough.
108. See Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 293, 296.
109. Mattingly Report, supra note 94, at 20.
110. Id.
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wishes of the mapmaker. The mapmaker can weight the criteria as desired, can
add and subtract criteria, and can define criteria. 111 Thus, commissions could use
MCMC-inspired methods to create ensembles of maps that take account of all
the state’s legitimate districting criteria, and they can score those maps using
reasonable substantive fairness metrics, such as how many Democrats or
Republicans would be elected using that map, proportionality, or efficiency gap.
Since commissions are not only trying to discover and avoid partisan
gerrymanders but may also be trying to achieve substantive fairness as a positive
goal, they could even use MCMC methods for the purpose of choosing the
fairest maps they can find: seeking the best possible solution rather than
sampling to prove a challenged map is an outlier. They could do this by coding
fairness metrics into the algorithm’s weighted scoring function. The algorithm
would then be searching for substantively fair maps, taking other legitimate
criteria into account at the same time. After running the MCMC process for
long enough, the commission can choose the map with the best weighted sum,
or at least pick from a small collection of maps with the highest weighted
sums. 112 This is promising and exciting in and of itself, but in the next section,
I explain how MCMC-type methodologies can be applied to solve a different,
and perhaps even more pressing, problem 113: squaring the Voting Rights Act
with the Equal Protection Clause, or, put differently, reconciling
antisubordination and anticlassification goals in redistricting.
B.

The Caselaw’s Treatment of Analogous Methods

Congress can, in House Bill 1, provide commissions with standards for
how to thread the racial gerrymandering needle, incorporating the best available
ensemble methods, which can accommodate the consideration of minority
rights in a constitutional manner, by ensuring that other districting criteria are

111. Id. at 20–22.
112. Unfortunately, some rules governing redistricting commissions, including the proposed rules
in House Bill 1, prohibit the consideration of voting histories and partisan registrations in developing
maps. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 2413(a)(3) (2019). These laws should be
amended to permit consideration of that data for the purpose of achieving, or at least checking for,
partisan fairness.
113. The problem of obtaining maps that are fair in the partisan sense may be reasonably well
solved by the use of independent redistricting commissions alone. Not much study of these
commissions’ success has been done, but one study by the Public Policy Institute of California provides
reason to believe these commissions will likely improve the problem of partisan gerrymandering,
although they may not be able to fully eradicate it without use of methods, such as MCMC methods,
to “check” that their work has neutral results. See MCGHEE, supra note 16, at 5–6. On the other hand,
without intervention by Congress, it is reasonable to think that section 2 of the VRA may be either
struck down under the Equal Protection Clause as beyond Congress’s enforcement powers or gutted
to the point that it no longer provides protection to historically subordinated groups, becoming largely
a tool to cover up and excuse partisan gerrymandering. See Pildes, supra note 32, at 1552.
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not subordinated to the promotion of minorities’ voting power. These methods
can avoid race becoming the dominant factor 114 in any chosen district map.
In fact, in other contexts, this is exactly the type of use of race that has
been understood to be acceptable under the Equal Protection Clause. Racebased action has been more likely to be upheld when the magnitude of the
weight given to race is not too high and does not outweigh other state interests.
For instance, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 115 the Supreme Court
upheld Texas’s use of individualized race-based affirmative action in university
admissions, just as it had upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s
similar use of race in Grutter v. Bollinger. 116 In both cases, part of the reason the
Court was willing to treat the policies as narrowly tailored to the compelling
state interest of diversity in higher education was that the policy did not treat
any student’s race as a dispositive factor. 117 Rather, each student was looked at
holistically, with race taken into account alongside other important factors such
as economic class, musical skill, and the like. 118 At the same time, the University
of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy, which took into account all
these factors but weighted race too heavily, such that it outweighed all other
factors, was struck down by the Supreme Court. 119
Additionally, in some other contexts, federal judges have given strong
indications that structural, advance attention paid to race in order to ensure a
policy does not harm subordinated groups or lock in the status quo would be
acceptable under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy, in both Ricci v.
DeStefano 120 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, indicated that he did not consider this type of attention to race to
necessarily be discriminatory in the same way that basing government action on
individual racial identities is discriminatory. 121 In Ricci, he wrote that the City
of New Haven had violated Title VII’s ban on intentional race discrimination
when it threw out the results of a promotion test after seeing the racial identities
of those who had performed better or worse. 122 However, he took care to note
114. In order for race-based gerrymandering to be unconstitutional, race must be the primary
motivating factor behind the choice of how to draw the offending district, in contrast to other contexts,
in which race need merely be a motivating factor behind state action in order to trigger strict scrutiny.
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643–46 (1993) (analyzing redistricting specifically); Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66, 270 (1977) (analyzing race-based state
action more generally).
115. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
116. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
117. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338–39.
118. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.
119. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255, 270 (2003).
120. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
121. Id. at 585; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579, 593.
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that it would and should be acceptable for the city, before administering such a
test, to analyze the potential racial impacts of the test and take that into account
when deciding whether or not to use the test. 123 In Parents Involved, he agreed
that using a student’s race as a tiebreaker in determining which school the
student would be assigned to should be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, and that it failed that scrutiny. 124 However, he concurred
separately to note that it would be acceptable for a school district to look at
racial demographics when deciding where to build new school sites and where
to draw attendance zone boundaries, for the purpose of achieving diverse,
racially integrated schools. 125 He stated that it was “unlikely” such actions
“would demand strict scrutiny,” 126 even though, ever since 1989, the federal
courts have applied strict scrutiny to race-based action, even when it is
performed to benefit racial minorities. 127
More recently, in Fisher, the Court approvingly discussed the fact that
individualized use of race was minimized in the University of Texas’s
affirmative action program by using a formally race-neutral program to fill most
of the student body’s slots, even though that program was concededly intended
to achieve certain racial effects. 128 That program, often called the “Top Ten
Percent Plan,” guarantees admission to students who perform at the top of their
high school class. 129 Because Texas public schools remain quite racially
segregated, this results in racially diverse admitted classes. 130 Even as the
individualized, holistic race-based program for the other slots was upheld in
Fisher, the Court conceded that the Top Ten Percent Plan was purposefully
race-conscious, and stated that as such, using it for all slots would not be “more
race neutral.” 131 Yet, the existence of the Top Ten Percent Plan was deemed a
positive thing, in that it diminished the need for the use of different treatment
based on individual students’ races. 132

123. Id. at 585.
124. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733–35, 782 (explaining, in a portion of the Court’s opinion with
which Justice Kennedy concurred, that the consideration of race was not narrowly tailored because
“[t]he districts have . . . failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial
classifications to achieve their stated goals”).
125. Id. at 788–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 789.
127. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989).
128. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2213 (2016) (“[T]he Top Ten Percent Plan,
though facially neutral, cannot be understood apart from its basic purpose, which is to boost minority
enrollment.”).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2212 (“The fact that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion of
admissions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of unconstitutionality.”).
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Of course, it is unlikely that if a school district purposely drew its
attendance zones in order to achieve segregation, or if a city chose an
employment test because it would impact African Americans negatively, or if a
state university engaged in a “top ten percent” program because it would reduce
admissions for people of color, that Justice Kennedy would have considered
such actions anything other than odious race discrimination violating multiple
laws, including the Constitution. Thus, we should read Justice Kennedy’s
musings in these cases as indicating that there is in fact room, in the eyes of
those who subscribe to anticlassification values, for structural, demographybased affirmative action that does not cause large, individualized harms and
benefits.
And this view is not just a quirk of Justice Kennedy, who of course is no
longer on the Supreme Court. For years, the Supreme Court has admonished
government actors engaged in race-based affirmative action to consider
structural, formally race-neutral alternatives, such as class-based rather than
race-based affirmative action. In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. 133 and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,134 the Court promoted these alternatives as
actions the government defendants should have taken in order for their actions
to be deemed “narrowly tailored,” and thereby pass muster under strict
scrutiny. 135 Yet those alternatives would clearly be intended to achieve benefits
for racially subordinated groups. 136
Finally, the Supreme Court has permitted race-conscious action in
redistricting to a degree unmatched in any other context because it has held that
in order to trigger strict scrutiny, race must be the primary motivating factor, 137
rather than merely a motivating factor, which is all that is required in every
other context under the Equal Protection Clause. 138 Recently, the Court has
described the harm of racial gerrymandering as “being personally subjected to
a racial classification as well as being represented by a legislator who believes
his primary obligation is to represent only the members of a particular racial
group.” 139
If we put all this together, it appears that redistricting that is cognizant of
the impacts of district lines on racial communities, and that purposely seeks to
avoid any negative impacts on those communities in the form of less
133. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
134. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
135. Id. at 237–38; Croson, 488 U.S. at 498, 507.
136. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV.
494, 556–57 (2003).
137. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (“[T]he party attacking the legislature’s
decision bears the burden of proving that racial considerations are ‘dominant and controlling’ . . . .”
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995))).
138. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66, 270 (1977).
139. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017).
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opportunity to elect preferred candidates than other communities have, should
be acceptable under the Equal Protection Clause to many, including those who
subscribe to an anticlassification view of equal protection, so long as the desire
to create opportunity districts does not outweigh other legitimate and important
districting criteria. Such activity in redistricting is structural, just like Justice
Kennedy’s proposed redrawing of attendance zones in order to achieve
integration. It does not assign any voter to a district or exclude any voter from
a district because of his or her individual race. The cognizance of race is at the
demographic level. Moreover, the cognizance of race is not outsized, unlike the
points assigned to race in Gratz v. Bollinger 140 that outweighed all other factors
for students who were otherwise qualified for admission. 141 In the past, it has
been difficult to quantify the relative weight given to racial communities and
their representation in the redistricting process. But now, commissions and
mapmakers can use MCMC-style methods to ensure all criteria are considered
and that no one criterion is given outsized weight, and seek to achieve maps
that perform well on all criteria. The ensembles they create can be assessed to
ensure that outlier maps on criteria like partisan fairness are not chosen in order
to achieve minimal benefits on the criterion of opportunity for minority
communities.
Indeed, even without congressional clarification, there is a strong argument
that when a redistricting commission uses MCMC-style algorithms to consider
a variety of significantly different yet reasonable maps, it need not justify efforts
to ensure equal opportunity for minority communities on the grounds that those
communities have a section 2 right under the standards the federal courts have
set. Part of the reason why the federal courts have chosen an incredibly narrow
definition of when a community has the right to an opportunity district under
section 2 is because they understand opportunity-district creation to be an
activity that necessarily triggers strict scrutiny. It must, on this analysis, be
severely limited in order to remain narrowly tailored to some compelling
interest such as remedying past, intentional racial discrimination in voting. 142
But the latest mathematical methods can be used to choose maps that are
beneficial to racial minorities without making race so primary—without
subordinating other criteria to race. As the Supreme Court has conceded, it is
impossible to be completely race-blind, at least when engaging in
redistricting. 143

140.
141.
142.
143.

539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Id. at 271–72.
See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018).
See Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 797; Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 245, 258 (2001).
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III. MATH FOR THE PEOPLE: HOW TO RECONCILE ANTISUBORDINATION
AND ANTICLASSIFICATION IN REDISTRICTING
House Bill 1, the For the People Act passed by the House of
Representatives, currently contains a great level of procedural detail to
operationalize independent redistricting commissions across the nation, via a
detailed section called “The Redistricting Reform Act of 2019.” 144 Like most
independent commission statutes or initiatives, it also mandates Voting Rights
Act and constitutional compliance in redistricting as the two highest-priority
criteria to which commissions must subject maps. 145 However, it fails to provide
any instruction to commissions on how to thread that needle, and at least so far,
it makes no substantive amendments to the VRA. 146 It even contains some
language that could inadvertently promote overpacking of racial and ethnic
minorities, which would needlessly dilute their voting power. 147
Fortunately, the recent advances of mathematicians and political scientists
working on the problem of partisan gerrymandering could be employed to fulfill
the duty to protect minority voters while still complying with the Constitution.
As I detail in the next sections, with just a few improvements, the Redistricting
Reform Act could help redistricting commissions take advantage of these
advances in order to protect minority voting power while also staying within
constitutional guidelines.
A.

What Math for the People Can Do

Many of the mathematicians using outlier analysis in partisan
gerrymandering litigation were seeking to represent the full space of reasonable,
valid maps as well as possible maps in order to demonstrate that a challenged
map was an outlier among that space in terms of partisanship. Thus, they
developed methods that sought to create not only large numbers of such maps
but many different types of such maps, meaning maps that occupy very different
parts of the “map-space” of all reasonable and valid maps. 148 They have also
144. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 2400–2415 (2019).
145. Id. § 2413(a)(1)(A)–(B).
146. The Act calls for reauthorization of the VRA but has no actual findings or proposed alterations
to the substantive text yet. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013), is explicitly criticized, but there is no mention of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), or
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). H.R. 1 § 2001.
147. H.R. 1 § 2413(a)(1)(D) (stating that districts must minimize the division of “communities of
interest, neighborhoods, and political subdivisions to the extent practicable” and that “[a] community
of interest . . . includ[es] . . . ethnic, racial, economic, social, cultural, geographic or historic identities”).
148. See Ramachandran & Gold, supra note 9, at 296–97 (first citing Yan Y. Liu, Wendy K. Tam
Cho & Shaowen Wang, PEAR: A Massively Parallel Evolutionary Computation Approach for Political
Redistricting Optimization and Analysis, 30 SWARM & EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 78, 82–86
(2016); and then citing Sachet Bangia et al., Redistricting: Drawing the Line 16–18 (arXiv, Paper No.
1704.03360v2, May 8, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.03360v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L3BGGXE]).
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refined those methods to increase confidence that the methods are not getting
“stuck” in one particular part of the map-space. 149 This quality of MCMC-type
methods, that they can discover many significantly different maps, can be an
extremely useful quality outside of litigation. Rather than creating an ensemble
of hopefully representative maps, in order to prove that a particular map is an
outlier, one can use these methods to obtain many significantly different, yet
still reasonable, maps.
By significantly different, I mean maps that differ in terms of where the
cores of districts are located. Such maps are meaningfully different from each
other in the sense that they could potentially lead to different political
outcomes—different candidates being elected or at least running for office, or
different coalitions of interest groups finding it promising to work together. If
a person who is well-informed on the politics of a particular state were shown
two maps that are identical, save for the fact that two census blocks are switched,
he or she would not consider those two maps significantly different. He or she
would also not find those two maps significantly different even if thousands of
blocks were switched, but all such blocks were along the borders of the districts,
thereby leaving the central cores of each district intact. But if the central core
of one district in Map 1 were divided into two portions, with each portion being
assigned to different districts in Map 2, then an informed person might well
predict that Map 2 leads to significantly different political activity and
outcomes as compared to Map 1, since the voters in that central core are no
longer as motivated to form political coalitions with each other, as they are in
different districts. They are now more motivated to form coalitions with voters
that were previously not in the same district as them.
By reasonable maps, I mean maps that are legally valid because they
comply with the relevant state and federal criteria. For instance, maps are not
reasonable if they do not exhibit something very close to exact population
equality across districts, as that is a requirement of the Federal Constitution. 150
A map would also not be reasonable if it scored extremely low compared to
other maps on various measures of compactness in a state where the
redistricting entity is required to take the compactness of districts into account.
Similarly, a map would not be reasonable if it split twelve counties into multiple
districts, in a state where the law required minimization of county splits, and
where many other maps could be found that only split two counties into
multiple districts without sacrificing any of the even more rigid criteria such as
population equality.

149. See Mattingly Report, supra note 94, at 15–16; METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING
GRP., supra note 9, at 4, 12–13.
150. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 557–58 (1964) (articulating the one-person, one-vote
standard).
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Because the best of the ensemble production methods, including MCMCstyle methods, obtain a large variety of significantly different yet reasonable
maps, 151 if we put them to use in redistricting, we can have much greater
confidence than before that we are not missing out on maps with more rather
than fewer opportunity districts. Indeed, the Metric Geometry and
Gerrymandering Group, using a sophisticated MCMC-style method,152 has
found that a potentially larger number of opportunity districts were available in
the Virginia House of Delegates than even the Democratic Governor, who was
seeking a remedy to a court-determined racial gerrymander, 153 had proposed. In
this report, the authors found a number of maps with fourteen districts—and
some with fifteen or sixteen districts—that contained a Black Voting Age
Population (“BVAP”) of over 37%. 154 In contrast, the Democratic Governor’s
proposed remedial plan had only thirteen districts with BVAP over 37%, while
the originally enacted plan that had been found to intentionally overpack
African American voters had twelve such districts. 155 The authors noted that
thirty-two of thirty-four federal congressional districts with BVAP over 37%
are represented by members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and argued
that, in combination with expert testimony on racially polarized voting in
Virginia that had been presented at trial, 37% was a reasonable cutoff for
considering a district to be a potential opportunity district. 156 All the maps the
authors found with BVAP over 37% were part of an ensemble of maps that take
into account the state’s legitimate districting criteria. 157
Moreover, for a mapmaker working by hand, trying to determine how
many opportunity districts can be created, the Equal Protection Clause serves
as a constant, nagging reminder that even as one tries to create opportunity
districts, one may not let race dominate one’s thoughts, and one may not
subordinate other legitimate districting principles, such as avoiding county
splits, to race. But MCMC methods and other forms of ensemble production
151. See Mattingly Report, supra note 94, at 20 (describing testing the algorithm and being able to
visualize districts moving from one end of the state to another as the process iterates); METRIC
GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., supra note 9, at 12–13, 15 (describing various measures the
group used to test whether their methods were sampling effectively and finding a particular mixed
methodology to work the best).
152. METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., supra note 9, at 13 (describing a novel and
highly effective “ReCom” MCMC method for traversing the map-space, in which chunks of units are
reassigned between two districts at once, rather than only one or two units being switched between
districts at a time).
153. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 175 (E.D. Va. 2018).
154. See METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., supra note 9, at 5.
155. See Bethune-Hill, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 178; METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP.,
supra note 9, at 6.
156. METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., supra note 9, at 3–4 (citing the expert
report of Maxwell Palmer).
157. Id. at 3 & n.3 (listing the criteria that were coded into the process, such as contiguity,
population equality, and minimization of municipal splits).
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can completely avoid this tension by finding maps that both minimize vote
dilution for communities with a section 2 right 158 and perform quite well, if not
extremely well, on other legitimate districting criteria. As the various criteria,
including creating opportunity for voters with a section 2 right, are assigned
weights, the mapmaker can ensure that the weight on this “minority protection”
factor is lower than other criteria that are even higher priority, such as
population equality. The mapmaker can also ensure that the weight is lower
than the combined weight of other criteria, such as compactness and minimizing
county splitting.
Exactly when a community has a section 2 right can be understood under
current law as articulated in Gingles, or, ideally, under slightly broader
conditions that Congress should clarify, as I have argued above. But either way,
once such a community is identified, the newest ensemble methods allow
mapmakers to work to create an opportunity district for that community
without subordinating that goal to other, legitimate districting criteria, thereby
avoiding an Equal Protection Clause violation. If multiple criteria are
considered and valued simultaneously, and if the weight assigned to benefiting
racial minorities is not outsized, 159 then that factor should not be understood to
be the dominant motivating factor behind any chosen map. Other factors have
not been subordinated to race.
B.

Proposed Amendments to the “For the People Act”

Commissions need tools to avoid accidentally choosing maps that are
unfair in both a partisan sense and that underprotect or overpack minority
communities. They also need to be able to do so without committing an Equal
Protection Clause violation. House Bill 1 provides for $150,000 per
congressional district (when a state has more than one district) for these
commissions to do their work but so far fails to specify what should be done
with that money. 160 House Bill 1 should be amended as follows:
1. Fairness Should Be Assessed According to the Best Available Mathematical
and Scientific Methods
First, the statute should both permit and require commissions to employ
sound mathematical and scientific methods to assess the fairness of maps, as
well as to assist in discovering maps that better comply with all the relevant
criteria, state and federal. In its current form, the bill does not permit the

158. See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2314, 2335 (2018) (using similar language).
159. Compare Grutter v Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338, 343 (2003) (upholding use of race in law
school admissions), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (forbidding outsized use of race
in undergraduate school admissions).
160. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 2431 (2019).
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consideration of partisan affiliation or voting histories in developing maps, 161
but this needs to be amended to permit commissions to use this data for the
limited purpose of seeking to achieve more fair maps, or at least to check their
work and ensure they have not created a partisan outlier, perhaps through
capture by partisans attempting to influence the commission.
Beyond this basic permission to use partisan data for fairness goals, the
statute should require the use of sound methods. One way to carry out this
mandate is via the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”). In its current
form, House Bill 1 reauthorizes the EAC, which is a nonpartisan agency that
was created in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 162 to, among other things,
assist states with election security and integrity, upgrade voting systems, and
ensure registration administration is compliant with federal law. 163 The agency
has had its funding reduced to almost nothing, and there have been attempts to
abolish it. 164 Much attention has been paid to the need to renew authorization
to the agency and fund it appropriately in an age of heightened security and
election-integrity concerns. 165 But House Bill 1 can go further and empower the
agency to promulgate guidance, or even regulations, carrying out the
Redistricting Reform Act. In particular, the agency should be empowered to
specify methods that state commissions should use to assess the fairness of
maps.
For instance, the agency could provide that commissions
must employ an MCMC-style method, or one similarly accepted in the
mathematical community, for creating map ensembles. They must
consider the distribution of these maps on the metrics of efficiency gap,
competitiveness, and partisan skew, and they must choose a map that
falls within the first and third quartiles on each of those distributions.
Or, the agency could provide that commissions
must use an MCMC-style method, or one similarly accepted in the
mathematical community, to pick the best available map on all relevant
state and federal criteria. They must code reasonable partisan fairness
metrics as a criterion in their algorithm, with a minimum relative weight
of twice any federally optional criteria.
161. Id. § 2413(a)(3)(B).
162. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145
(2012)).
163. See id. § 202, 116 Stat. at 1673–74 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20922).
164. See Russell Berman, The Federal Voting Agency Republicans Want To Kill, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/election-assistance-commissionrepublicans-congress/516462/ [https://perma.cc/LE2F-E9ZA] (explaining that “[e]very odd-numbered
year since 2011, Republicans in the House have tried to kill the Election Assistance Commission . . .
[and] [t]his year, the same fight has taken on much greater urgency”).
165. See id.
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This would ensure that maps are optimized for a variety of factors but with a
relatively high weight given to partisan fairness, along with significant weight
given to the other legitimate criteria chosen by the state.
2. Gingles and Its Progeny, Designed for the Courts, Must Not Become
Restraints on Redistricting Commissions
Second, the statute should not describe VRA compliance as a criterion that
redistricting commissions should prioritize without further clarification of what
that means. Since in its current form House Bill 1 does almost nothing to alter
Gingles and Strickland’s interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, this criterion
could be read to imply that states should only provide opportunity districts to
those communities that could meet the current Gingles standard. But this would
be far too restrictive, as described above, and it may even lead to overpacking.
Instead, the criterion should state that
whenever minority racial, language, or ethnic communities have likely
been less able to elect preferred candidates than other communities,
commissions must avoid diluting their votes through unfavorable
electoral maps and must instead employ the full array of sound
mathematical and scientific methods to explore the possibility of
opportunity districts for those communities.
The criterion should specify that
an opportunity district is one in which the community has equal
opportunity to elect preferred candidates as other communities in the
state have, either because the percentage of the voting age population in
the district creates that opportunity, or because the electoral system used
in the district, such as a multimember district with ranked choice voting,
affords that opportunity.
The statute should also clearly specify that
it need not be possible to form a “majority-minority district” for such a
community to be entitled to protection from dilution of that
opportunity, particularly in coalition with other groups
and that
it is acceptable for commissions to create multimember districts with
ranked choice voting as a means of affording minority voters
opportunity.
While the bill in its current form permits of all these interpretations, and
helpfully mentions that commissions “shall not dilute or diminish their ability
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to elect candidates of choice whether alone or in coalition with others,” 166 the
Supreme Court has a history of reading progressive amendments to civil rights
statutes narrowly, even when Congress explicitly calls out prior Supreme Court
interpretations that it considers to be erroneous. 167 Thus, more specificity would
be helpful.
3. Federal Law Should Not Mandate that Jurisdictional or Other Splits Be
Avoided
Third, House Bill 1’s language directing commissions to “respect
communities of interest . . . to the extent practicable” should at least be changed
to remove reference to ethnic minorities as examples of such communities that
should not be split. 168 This language could easily be read by a court hostile to
minority voting rights to imply that extreme packing of minorities is favored,
which it should not be, as this leads to noncompetitive districts in which large
numbers of minority voters must cast wasted votes. 169 Minority interest groups
may have sought this language as an assurance that commissions would not
harm the opportunity of minority communities to elect candidates of
preference, but that reassurance can hopefully come from amending the bill, as
I am proposing, to greatly strengthen the Voting Rights Act’s assurance of equal
opportunity and secure its constitutionality, not through language that could
easily be used to harm minority communities through overpacking. Ideally, the
criterion of minimizing division of communities would be deleted from House
Bill 1 entirely. Not all states may believe that county splitting or the like is a
severely negative quality in an electoral map, and there is no need to give such
a criterion the importance potentially implied by the words “to the extent
practicable.” Such a criterion can, like any criterion, conflict with the much
more universally important criteria of partisan fairness, protection of minority
communities that have been historically subordinated, and population equality
across single-member districts.

166. H.R. 1 § 2413(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).
167. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation
of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 513 (2009) (“Using examples from
employment discrimination jurisprudence, this Article demonstrates that courts often continue to
follow statutory interpretation precedents whose holdings have been repudiated by Congress.”).
168. H.R. 1 § 2413(a)(1)(D).
169. Guinier, supra note 30, at 1592 (describing why such wasting is a harm).
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4. The Statute Should Clarify What “Equal Opportunity” Means: A Typical
Level of Competitiveness
Fourth, House Bill 1 should clarify what it means for a community to have
equal opportunity to elect preferred candidates as other communities have, 170
and the EAC should be authorized to promulgate guidance or regulations that
help commissions give this criterion some weight while also avoiding
constitutional violations. This can be done as follows.
Consider that the percentage of votes a minority-preferred candidate
receives in a particular district can be modeled extremely roughly as follows, for
either the relevant primary election or the general election:
Estimated Percent of Votes Minority-Preferred Candidate Gets =
MVAP × ML × MT + (1 − MVAP) × CL × CT
where,
MVAP = Minority Voting Age Population, a percentage that will depend
on the borders of a district and census data
ML = Minority Level, the estimated level of support from minority
voters that the minority-preferred candidate tends to get in elections.
MT = Minority Turnout Level, the historic turnout percentage of the
minority community.
CL = Coalition Level, 171 the percentage of “other” voters (both white and
other minority group members) who, in a particular area, tend to prefer
the same candidate preferred by the particular group of minority voters
we are seeking to protect. (If these groups do not exhibit similar levels
of support for the minority-preferred candidate, meaning the candidate
preferred by the particular minority group we are seeking to protect, they
should be broken down as necessary into CL1, CL2, . . . .)
CT = Coalition Turnout Level, the historic turnout percentage of the
“other” voters who are deemed willing to vote for the minority-preferred
candidate. (Again, if these “other” voters are not similar in their levels
of support/turnout, this can be broken down into CT1, CT2, . . . .)

170. Cf. Thornbug v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality
in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”).
171. Note that this number may be different for primary and general elections. For instance, some
white Democrat voters may vote against the minority-preferred candidate in the primary election but
be willing to vote for that candidate in the general election.
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ML, MT, CL, and CT can be estimated based on historical data, using the type
of expert reports that are now used in Voting Rights Act litigation.
Thus, the estimated percentage of votes a minority-preferred candidate
gets in a district, in both the primary and general elections, can be targeted to
the desired levels by altering the MVAP in the district. This is exactly what
mapmakers do when seeking to create opportunity districts. They seek to create
a district in which one expects the minority-preferred candidate to obtain some
percentage of votes that is at least close to 50%, perhaps even higher. Litigants’
experts often argue over their estimates of components such as CL—levels of
support for the minority-preferred candidate from whites—and MT—levels of
minority turnout—and especially how they might change with increased
opportunity. 172 Because they argue about these components, they argue about
what MVAP is necessary to achieve that expected percentage of votes (around
50%) which leads to the preferred candidate winning at least some of the time. 173
For instance, in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 174 a case
challenging overpacking of minorities in Virginia, the trial court found:
[T]he 12 challenged districts, including District 75, varied widely in the
extent to which white voters supported Democratic candidates, the party
overwhelmingly preferred by black voters. Notably, in District 75, only
16% of white voters supported Democratic candidates, an extremely high
level of racially polarized voting. . . . This data clearly showed that
District 75 differed in important ways from the remainder of the
challenged districts, and that District 75 required the highest BVAP level
of any district. . . . Dr. Palmer also concluded, with 95% confidence, that
a 55% BVAP in each of the 11 challenged districts would produce a
Democratic vote share of at least 66.3% (in District 63), and as high as
83.7% (in District 71). . . . Accordingly, the 55% BVAP threshold was far
greater than necessary for black voters to continue electing their
preferred candidates. 175
If we set the MVAP too high, we are creating not just the opportunity for
the minority-preferred candidate to be elected but in fact an “ultra-safe” district,
which may harm that very same minority community by making it impossible
to create a second, neighboring district where there is also opportunity to select
another preferred candidate. Indeed, in the wake of the 1982 Amendments to
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, there was an incentive for incumbent

172. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 178–79 (E.D. Va.
2018) (citing expert report of Maxwell Palmer to undermine Virginia’s claim that a Black Voting Age
Percentage of 55% or higher was necessary for VRA compliance).
173. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 (stating that the “totality of the circumstances” should be assessed
in making these determinations).
174. 326 F. Supp. 3d 128 (E.D. Va. 2018).
175. Id. at 178–79.
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minority Democrat legislators to broker deals with incumbent Republican
legislators that would overpack minorities in their districts, in order to increase
the safety of many of the incumbents’ seats, at the expense of Democrats as well
as the minority voters themselves. 176
But outside the context of litigation, in which experts try to characterize
the components of the prediction in ways favorable to the litigants’ positions,
there is a deeper question that Congress has never answered, and which they
can answer now: What is the expected percentage of votes for the minoritypreferred candidate that one should be targeting? Are multiple reasonably
competitive districts better, or is one extremely safe district better? In other
words, what level of competitiveness versus safety is right? House Bill 1 can
specify that
in order for a minority group to have an equal chance to elect candidates
of choice, opportunity districts must be created in which the level of
competitiveness of the district is similar to the level of competitiveness
nonminority voters would typically expect to experience.
The EAC should be authorized to promulgate guidance or even regulations
governing how to estimate that level of competitiveness.
For instance, the EAC could specify a state-by-state procedure as follows:
Commissions using MCMC-style ensembles and optimization techniques to
select a high-quality map should, where possible, create an ensemble of maps
that incorporates all relevant districting criteria without encoding the creation
of opportunity districts as a districting criterion. The maps in these ensembles
should be scored on average competitiveness in both primary and general
elections of the resulting districts. Competitiveness levels between the fortieth
and sixtieth percentile (or some other broader or narrower range) could be
defined as an “opportunity range.”
It may turn out that when this analysis is performed in many states the
opportunity range does not vary significantly across the nation. (Currently,
states in which one party has complete power over the redistricting process
likely engage in greater degrees of partisan gerrymandering, and therefore have
reduced numbers of competitive districts, as compared to states in which the
governor and legislature are from opposing parties or states in which a
nonpartisan redistricting commission is already in place.) 177 If that is the case,
the EAC could promulgate simpler guidance, defining an “opportunity range”
for the nation. The EAC should specify that a map that results in more districts
in the opportunity range should score higher than a map that results in fewer

176. See Taylor, supra note 71 (describing what a Lawyer Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
representative called “an unholy alliance”).
177. See MCGHEE, supra note 16, at 7.
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such districts with respect to the criterion of ensuring similar opportunity for
minority voters as other voters have.
Regardless of how the EAC sets the opportunity range, House Bill 1
should specify that
the creation of minority opportunity districts for the purpose of ensuring
minority groups have a similar chance as other groups to elect candidates
of choice should be given at least as high a weight as other state criteria
that are optional under federal law, such as compactness or minimizing
jurisdiction splits. However, in no case should the weight given to the
criterion of creating opportunity districts be higher than the combined
weight given to other criteria.
5. Congress’s Enforcement Powers Under the Reconstruction Amendments:
How Opportunity as Competitiveness
Reconciles the Court’s and Congress’s Views
Readers may understandably be wondering for some of these
amendments: Are the changes constitutional? The answer is yes. First, it is
acceptable for Congress to eliminate the 50% cutoff in Gingles because, as
explained in Part I, the cutoff simply ignores that minority communities can
form coalitions with other groups and, therefore, districts with well below 50%
of voters belonging to the minority can still be “opportunity” districts. Second,
as described in Section I.E, a great deal of the motivation for interpreting
section 2 of the VRA so narrowly has been the institutional capacity and
appropriateness of federal courts overseeing districting. 178 But redistricting
commissions are not courts, and they are not federal entities. They should
therefore receive more leeway under the Constitution. Third, as described in
Sections I.A–C, it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to ask
mapmakers to actively promote minority opportunity because the statute
provides for that goal to be balanced with another districting criterion: the map
must be reasonably fair on partisan grounds, with the method for determining
that set by the EAC. Moreover, the weight given to the criterion of creating
opportunity districts cannot be too high—it cannot subordinate other legitimate
districting principles.
Finally, the specific definition I propose for “equal opportunity to elect
preferred candidates,” as well as the method of defining “opportunity ranges”
that I propose, takes account of the Court’s cautionary note that section 2
ensures equal opportunity, not a “feast.” 179 As a result, my definition of
178. See Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 56, at 2152–53 (attempting to ameliorate this problem
with proposed bright-line rules).
179. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 15–16 (rejecting “the proposition . . . that section 2 entitles
minority groups to the maximum possible voting strength”).

98 N.C. L. REV. 273 (2020)

312

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

opportunity, which is tied to typical competitiveness of districts, ensures that
this section of the VRA remains within Congress’s enforcement powers under
the Reconstruction Amendments and probably increases the odds that section
2 will be upheld by the federal courts in the long run.
Observers have become rightly concerned, after the Court found section 5
of the VRA to be beyond Congress’s powers in Shelby County v. Holder, 180 that
the courts might soon find section 2, as well, to go beyond those powers. 181
Indeed, the Court may be interpreting section 2 narrowly in part because it
wishes to avoid questions of the section’s legitimacy as an exercise of Congress’s
enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. 182 The reason the
Supreme Court may view section 2 as illegitimate is that the Court has
promoted, for the past three decades at least, an anticlassification view of the
Equal Protection Clause, in which the elimination of formal racial advantages
and disadvantages is the goal. But Congress, in section 2, was promoting an
antisubordination view of the Equal Protection Clause, in which the elimination
of structural, social, and historical racial disadvantage is the goal. 183 In the past,
when these goals have come into conflict, the Court has sometimes, but not
always, found Congress to be exceeding its Reconstruction enforcement powers.
Facially neutral methods of achieving antisubordination goals have fared
particularly well. 184
My proposed definition of equal opportunity finds a way to satisfy both
values, at least in this context. Equal opportunity means that minority
communities get the same numerical level of competitiveness as majority
communities. Thus, anticlassification is satisfied: no person or racial group is
getting bonus points on the basis of race, even though the policy is raceconscious.
At the same time, when drawing election districts, attention is paid at the
structural level to minority opportunity in politics by aiming for the creation of
more of this equal level of opportunity. More districts in the opportunity
range—that typical level of competitiveness—is a criterion that mapmakers can
and must seek to achieve. In other words, mapmakers can and must strive hard
180. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
181. Id. at 549–50, 555–57; see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 126–27 (2010); Zachary
Roth, Conservatives Prepare To Finish Off Voting Rights Act, MSNBC (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/conservatives-prepare-finish-voting-ri
[https://perma.cc/2YZ4R5NM].
182. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 181, at 127–29.
183. See Guinier, supra note 30, at 1590; Siegel, supra note 20, at 1472–73.
184. Compare Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–40 (2003) (holding facially
gender-neutral dependent care and sick leave provisions of Family Medical Leave Act to be within
Congress’s enforcement powers), with Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360–
61, 374 (2001) (holding accommodation provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act to go beyond
Congress’s enforcement powers).
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to help minority communities. But more help does not mean more advantage
because opportunity is defined as typical competitiveness. Minority racial
groups will get extra attention but equal opportunity. No legislator representing
a district that is properly competitive, as opposed to a district in which minority
voters are heavily overpacked, would think that “his primary obligation is to
represent only the members of a particular racial group.” 185 In other contexts, it
may be difficult to reconcile these competing views of what equal protection
means, but in redistricting, we now have the tools.
CONCLUSION
Americans want fair electoral maps. Carrying this out effectively means
more than forming nonpartisan commissions subject to the same confusing and
competing legal rules that partisan mapmakers are subject to. The fairest
nonpartisan would find it difficult to navigate (a) section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act as interpreted in Gingles and Strickland; (b) the Equal Protection Clause; (c)
the demands of a variety of interest groups; and (d) the demands of partisan
interests posing as nonpartisan commenters. But inspired by recent litigation
and attention to the problem of partisan gerrymandering, mathematicians have
made advancements that could, if leveraged correctly, make real the promise of
racially fair maps. If Congress seizes the moment, perhaps this math can do the
seemingly impossible—satisfy both Congress’s antisubordination and the
courts’ anticlassification concerns, and bring truly equal opportunity to our
democratic system.

185. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (describing this as one
of the harms of racial classification in redistricting).
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